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The increase in large-scale federal and state programs utilizing
the power of eminent domain have made evident the lack of
eminent domain concepts and procedures which will facilitate the
completion of these programs without undue delay, while
concurrently providing adequate compensation for the damage
inflicted upon individual property owners. In focusing upon the
measure of compensation payable when the interests of lessors and
lessees are taken, Professor Johnston questions the validity of two
generally accepted concepts of existing doctrine, the market value
approach to compensation and the unit valuation approach to
apportionment. He points out that, although a judicial
reassessment of the unit valuation approach is already underway,
the ultimate responsibility for developing more adequate
approaches to compensation rests with the legislatures.
I. INTRODUCTION
The past two decades have witnessed the introduction of large-
scale federal and state programs utilizing the power of eminent
domain.' Other activities at all levels of government have multiplied
the varieties of public interference with the free choice of private
owners regarding the use and development of land, adding complex
new factual and policy variations to the venerable confusion over the
precise point at which "regulation" merges into "taking".! These
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I. The two most extensive programs, urban renewal and the interstate highway system, are
co-operative ventures between federal and state or local government. The federal role includes the
establishment of policies and standards as well as the provision of the major portion of the
financing, while implementation is the responsibility of state and local agencies to which the power
of eminent domain has been delegated by the states. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1453, 1460 (1964); Supp.
I, 1965; Supp. II, 1965-66); 23 U.S.C. §§ 103, 108 (1964; Supp. I, 1965-66). In the highway pro-
gram, exercise of the federal power of eminent domain is authorized in cases where a state is -un-
able to acquire necessary lands or interests in lands, or is unable to acquire such lands or interests
in lands with sufficient promptness." 23 U.S.C. § 107(a)(1) (1964).
where the taking is an exercise of the states' power of eminent domain, state law governs all
aspects of the proceeding. State v. George F. Lang Co., 191 A.2d 322 (Del. 1963). The threat of
withholding federal funds can be used to compel payment of compensation under circumstances
where, according to state law, it would not otherwise be required. See 23 U.S.C. § 131 (Supp. I,
1965; Supp. I, 1965-66); 42 Op. Ar'Y GEN. 26 (1966).
2. For example, airport zoning, control of highway access, historical and landmark zoning,
outdoor advertising control, and subdivision control exactions. These, and other related local
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programs and activities are part of a political effort to restrain the
excesses of an unruly technology and direct its enormous energies
toward improvement of the physical and social environment.
Implementation of programs that require acquisition of privately
owned land presents a formidable legal challenge: to adapt eminent
domain concepts and procedures so as to facilitate the completion of
these programs without undue delay, while concurrently providing
adequate compensation for the damage inevitably inflicted upon
individual property owners.
This article evaluates one aspect of the response to that challenge,
tracing the development of compensation law applicable to those
troublesome cases involving condemnation of land that is held in
divided ownership.4 It will focus particularly upon the measure of
compensation payable when the interests of lessors and lessees are
taken.
II. THE VALUATION APPROACH: MARKET VALUE V. INDEMNITY
Commentary on compensation in eminent domain sometimes
commences with the observation that there are three possible
approaches in determining the amount of a condemnee's recovery for
the taking of his land: (1) its value to the condemnee, (2) its value to
the condemnor, or (3) its value as determined by an intermediate,
"objective" test.- With virtual unanimity, American courts and
government controls, are not accompanied by physical appropriation of land. They are not,
therefore, classic "public use" takings; they are police power regulations. It is well established,
however, that such regulations can so seriously affect the owner's ability to use and enjoy his land
as to amount to a taking; unless compensation is provided, the purported regulation is invalid.
See. e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). Judicial opinions concerning the
validity of modern land use control devices have aroused lively discussion in recent years. The
most perceptive general treatment of the subject is Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165
(1967).
3. Michelman, supra note 2, exposed the conceptual inadequacy of many decisions holding
that landowners are not entitled to compensation for financial detriment unaccompanied by
physical appropriation for public use. Even where compensation is clearly payable, however,
negotiation and settlement procedures can result in gross and indefensible underpayment of
condemnees. See Berger & Rohan, The Nassau County Stud)': An Empirical Look Into The
Practices of Condemnation, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 430 (1967).
4. "Divided ownership" includes situations in which title to real property is held by two or
more persons, each of whom holds an interest lower than a fee simple absolute; for example mortga-
gor-mortgagee, life estate-remainderman, lessor-lessee, and base fee subject to an easement. It
does not include concurrent ownership in fee simple, such as tenancy in common, joint tenancy, or
tenancy by the entirety.
5. Lg., A. JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN § 67 (1953) [hereinafter cited as JAIIR]; L. ORGLL,
'VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 12 (2d ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as
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legislatures have opted for the objective approach, accepting the
"market value" test.' "By fair market value is meant the amount of
money which a purchaser willing but not obliged to buy the property
would pay to an owner willing but not obliged to sell it, taking into
consideration all uses to which the land was adapted and might in
reason be applied." 7
The requirement that the condemnee receive "just compensation"
is, of course, constitutional s Elsewhere, in the law of damages, the
term "compensation" connotes indemnity.' Had this connotation
been placed upon "just compensation" as the measure of damages in
eminent domain proceedings, ascertainment of the actual pecuniary
loss suffered by the condemnee would seem to be the proper approach.
Justification for selection of the intermediate, "objective" approach is
founded upon policy considerations, however, rather than logical
consistency. Since, as we shall see, the market yalue standard omits
ORGEL]; 4 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.1[5] (3d ed. 1962; Supp. 1968)
[hereinafter cited as NICHOLS]. But cj. Hale. Value to the Taker in Condemnation Cases, 31
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1931).
6. JAHR §§ 68-70; NICHOLS §§ 12.2-.22; 1 ORGEL §§ 13-15. This approach is sometimes
referred to as fair market value, but it has been observed that "the term 'fair' hardly adds
anything to the phrase 'market value'. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943)
(Roberts. J.).
7. 4 NICHOLS § 12.2[1]. The most popular methods for ascertaining market value are
comparable sales and capitalization of income. Where these methods cannot be applied,
replacement cost minus depreciation is frequently accepted as the best alternative method. See id.
§§ 12.311(3], 12.3122, 12.32; Comment, Real Estate Valuation in Condemnation Cases-The
Place for the Expert, 43 NEB. L. REV. 137 (1964)..For discussion of comparable sales and income
capitalization, see Boyer & Wilcox, An Economic Appraisal oJ Leasehold Valuation in Condent-
nation Proceedings, 17 U. MIAMI L. REV. 245, 252-55 (1963); Sengstock & McAuliffe, What is the
Price of Eminent Domain?, 44 J. URBAN L. 185 (1966).
8. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V. Every state except North Carolina has a comparable provision. See I NICHOLS
§ 1.3. North Carolina has held that the duty to pay just compensation arises from the due
process, or "law of the land," provision in its constitution. Yancy v. State Highway Comm'n,
222 N.C. 106, 22 S.E.2d 256 (1942); Johnston v. Rankin, 70 N.C. 550 (1874); See N.C. CONST.
art. I, § 17.
9. "In a case of tort. . . the general purpose of compensation is to give a sum of money to
the person wronged which as nearly as possible, will restore him to the position he would be in if
the wrong had not been committed. In the case of a breach of contract, the goal of compensation
is . . . to place the plaintiff in the position he would be in if the contract had been fulfilled." C.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 560-61 (1935). "Nevertheless, in most
situations the law finds it convenient to measure compensation for property or services by use of
the standard or analogy of 'market value.' " Id. at 166. "If indemnification is what the framers
of the Constitution had in mind in limiting eminent domain by requiring compensation, it
conclusively follows that loss to the owner is the most cogent inquiry in determining value in
condemnation. in practice, it is not." Sengstock & McAuliffe, What Is the Price oJ l:,ninent
Domain?, 44 J. URBAN L. 185, 190 (1966). See also Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent
Domain -Policy and C(oncept, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 596, 619-20 (1954).
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compensation for several categories of out-of-pocket expense actually
incurred by condemnees as a direct consequence of the taking, the
policy of cost minimization appears to conflict most directly with full
indemnity. The extent to which this policy comports with the
constitutional guarantee of just compensation is thus a crucial issue,
frequently presented for judicial determination. 0
If this analysis is accurate, it follows that utilization of the
market value standard, rather than indemnity, has the effect of
shifting part of the total cost of public improvements from the
benefiting taxpayers to the condemnees. One possible consequence is
the loss of resources invested by entrepreneurs in justifiable"
expectation of a subsequent economic return. In a policy sense, this
frustration of their reasonable expectations is pure confiscation.'
Departure from the indemnity standard is therefore ethically
questionable.13
10. Not surprisingly, courts almost never articulate this cost minimization factor or
verbalize their evaluation of its significance in individual cases. They have generally referred only
to the "practicality" or "convenience" of the fair market value approach. For example, "It is
conceivable that an owner's idemnity should be measured in various ways depending upon the
circumstances of each case and that no general formula should be used for the purpose. In an
effort, however, to find some practical standard, the courts early adopted, and have retained, the
concept of market value." United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1943).
For a refreshingly candid discussion of this usually unmentioned policy conflict, see the
dissenting opinion of Justice Traynor in Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 366, 144
P.2d 818, 832 (1944). See also Note, Discovery' of Expert Opinion in Land Condemnation
Proceedings, 41 IND. L.J. 506, 517-19 (1966).
II. The term "justifiable" is used in the sense that their enterprises violate no law or public
policy, and are therefore entitled to protection against private interference, harassment, or
confiscation.
12. "In the solution of any problem, the selection of persons to receive compensation, and
of the elements of loss or injury to be taken into consideration in assessing damages, is a measure
of the extent of property." Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases oJ Eninent Domain, 41 YALE L.J.
221, 248 (1931).
"Property is nothing but a basis of expectation; the expectation of deriving certain
advantages from a thing we are said to possess, in consequence of the relation in which we stand
toward it." J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION (6th ed. 1890).
Professor Michelman says that Bentham's analysis supplies "the germ of a theoretically
satisfying approach to compensation questions," which he states in a nutshell as: "An imposition
is compensable if not to compensate would be critically demoralizing; otherwise not." Michelman,
supra note 2, at 1211-13.
The condemnee's reasonable expectations were recognized and protected in United States v.
Certain Property Located in the Borough of Manhattan, 344 F.2d 142, 145 (2d Cir. 1965)
(Friendly. J.), and Levin v. State, 13 N.Y.2d 87, 192 N.E.2d 155 (1963); they were ignored in
Ballantyne Co. v. City of Omaha, 173 Neb. 229, 113 N.W.2d 486 (1962), and City of Durham v.
Eastern Realty Co., 270 N.C. 631, 155 SE.2d 231 (1967).
13. Professor Michelman counsels "resolute sophistication in the face of occasional
insistence that compensation payments must be limited lest society find itself unable to afford
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Judges can ameliorate the harshness which results from the
utilization of the market value standard through evidentiary rulings
and jury instructions which encourage awards in an amount greater
than the strictest application of this formula would permit." Of
course, the converse situation may also be encountered-especially
when the court is dubious about the desirability of the proposed
public improvement." In this posture, the intermediate, "objective"
approach becomes an invitation to unsystematic, even capricious,
allocation of the costs of eminent domain between condemnees and
the public.
The indemnity approach, on the other hand, would permit an
award to the condemnee sufficient to restore him to substantially the
same position he occupied before the taking. 6 Recoverable damages
would probably include: (1) the cost of comparable substitute
facilities, (2) relocation costs, including losses and expenses incurred
in moving equipment and inventory, and (3) other expenses necessarily
and actually incurred as a result of the taking, as well as other losses
that may reasonably be attributed to it. The first two categories
present routine problems of proof. The third category includes issues
of more uncertain resolution, including loss of anticipated profits. It
may be well to note, however, that these issues are not -materially
different from those which are routinely resolved by the judicial
system in tort and contract cases.17 By comparison the market value
test, as usually applied, permits direct consideration of none of these
factors. The usual determinants of market value are comparable sales
or income capitalization. Replacement cost, or the cost of substitute
facilities, is rarely admissible. 8 In general, moving costs and business
beneficial plans and improvements. What society cannot, indeed, afford is to impoverish itself."
Michelman, supra note 2, at 1181. See Interstate Finance Corp. v. Iowa City, 149 N.W.2d 308
(Iowa 1967).
14. See text accompanying note 19 injra.
15. This ability to influence the jury's attitude extends also to permitting "pocketbook
appeals" in closing arguments of counsel, Frost v. State. 284 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955),
and to suggestive instructions before verdict, Welsbach Street Lighting Co. of America v. City of
Philadelphia, 318 Pa. 166, 178 A. 126 (1935). But see Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 936 (1968).
16. Sometimes courts state the right to compensation in terms of indemnity, -even though
they. actually apply the market value approach. See text accompanying notes 20-29 njura.
17. Acceptable methods of proving prospective profits are discussed in 5 A. CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 1023 (1964): C. MCCORMICK. HANI)BOOK ON TH LAW O- DAM1AGEs §§ 25.
30 (1935); 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1346A, (1937; Supp. 1968).
18. JAHR § 82; 4 NICHOLS § 12.32; 20RGEL § 189. The Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1968 provides, however, for payment to home owners displaced by urban renewal of "an
amount [not to exceed $5,000] which, when added to the acquisition payment, equals the average
price required for a decent, safe, and sanitary dwelling of modest standards. ... Pub. L. No.
90-448, § 516 (Aug. I, 1968).
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interruption losses are not recoverable as separate items of damage
under the market value test, although some courts admit such
evidence for its bearing on the price a willing seller would accept for
the condemnee's interest. 9
Phraseology connoting support for the indemnity approach may
be found in several Supreme Court opinions. One of the earliest was
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States," where part of an Act
of Congress2' authorizing the taking of a dam and lock on the
Monongahela River was invalidated. The lock was constructed and
owned by the condemnee corporation which was deriving income from
toll charges under a franchise granted by the State of Pennsylvania.
The Act specified that, in determining the compensation payable to
the condemnee, "the franchise of said corporation to collect tolls shall
not be considered or estimated . . . ." The Court held that this
portion of the statute was in conflict with the fifth amendment. The
opinion asserts that, in order to comport with constitutional
standards, compensation must be a "full and perfect equivalent for
the property taken," or, as it was expressed later in the same
paragraph, a "full and exact equivalent. 22
A similar exposition of the constitutional standard for
compensation in eminent domain proceedings is this statement from
Bauman v. Ross:
The just compensation required by the Constitution to be made to the owner
is to be measured by the loss caused to him by the appropriation. He is entitled
to receive the value of what he has been deprived of, and no more. To award
him less would be unjust to him; to award him more would be unjust to the
public2
19. JAHR §§ 112-15: 4 Nicnots §§ 13.3-.33, 14.2471-72: I ORGEL §§ 68-77. It is often
asserted that such losses are not compensable because the condemnor takes only the land, not the
owner's business. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341 (1925). This begs the question.
It also conflicts with the utilitarian analysis. See note 12 %upra. There are also difficult problems
of proof: "There is no practical way of isolating the actual productivity which is directly
attributable to land separately from the other elements of production." Boyer & Wilcox, .1n
Economic Appraisal of Leasehold Valuation in Condemnation Proceedings, 17 U. MIANI L. REv.
245, 266 (1963).
For an excellent analysis of the problems, with suggestions for more adequate awards, see
Comment, Eminent Domain Valuations in An Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67 YALE
L.J. 61 (1957).
20. 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
21. Act of Aug. II, 1888, ch. 860, 25 Stat. 400.
22. 148 U.S. at 326 (emphasis added).
23. 167 U.S. 548 (1897).
24. Id. at 574. The condemnee attacked the practice of determining compensation in eases
of partial taking by offsetting special benefits accruing to the condemnee's remaining land against
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Other decisions have made it clear, however, that the Court had
no intention of reading the indemnity approach into the Constitution.
As Mr. Justice Holmes stated it, condemnees are entitled to receive
"the value of the property taken, and that means what it fairly may
be believed that a purchaser in fair market conditions would have
given for it in fact."'2s In Mitchell v. United States,6 the condemnee's
business was destroyed as a consequence of the taking, but this loss
was not compensable as a separate item of damage 7 Finally, United
States v. Miller28 attempted to integrate the two approaches, but
merely confirmed the Court's preference for the market value test:
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Such compensation
means the full and perfect equivalent in money of the property taken. The owner
is to be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would have occupied if his
property had not been taken.
It is conceivable that an owner's indemnity should be measured in various
ways depending upon the circumstances of each case and that no general formula
should be used for the purpose. In an effort, however, to find some practical
standard, the courts early adopted, and have retained, the concept of market
value . . . . The term . . . denotes . . . "market value fairly determined." 29
In a situation such as the Mitchell case, or one in which the
condemnor will demolish structures or fixtures formerly used to
produce income, the taking visits a financial loss upon the condemnee,
perhaps completely destroying his business. The condemnor, however,
has reaped no corresponding gain ° In fact, the improvements may
the value of the portion actually appropriated. The court held that this offset was consistent with
the constitutional guarantee of just compensation.
25. City of New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57, 61 (1915).
26. 267 U.S. 341 (1925).
27. The evidence showed that the condemnee's land was especially suited to the growing of a
special grade of corn. It was impossible for the condemnee to replace the land, and consequently,
he was forced to remove himself from the business of raising and canning corn. While the
condemnee was entitled to consideration of the land's "special value . . . due to its adaptability
for use in a particular business," Id. at 344, loss of the business as such was not compensable.
Contra, Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. I (1949).
28. 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
29. Id. at 373-74.
30. In Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893), where the
condemnor was in a position to collect tolls as the condemnee had done, the franchise was
compensable; in Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341 (1925), a business destroyed incident to a
taking for other purposes was not compensable. These cases would suggest the application of a
"value to the taker" test. In Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. I (1949), the loss
of laundry routes was held compensable despite the fact that the condemnor had no intention of us-
ing them. The apparent inconsistency with Mitchell v. United States may be explained by the fact
that Kimball Laundrr involved only a temporary taking; more lenient standards of compensability
are sometimes applied in such cases. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373
thereafter made available for sale and redevelopment. 42 U.S.C. § 1460(0 (1964).
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
serve only to impede preparation of the land for its intended use3 In
such a case, there is considerable disparity between the land's value to
the former owner and its value to the condemnor. Between these
extremes stands the market value approach, with its apparent
impartiality. If, however, it presupposes a willing, knowledgeable
buyer and seller, neither of whom is under any compulsion, it cannot
realistically be applied to our case. In the absence of compulsion, no
rational person in the condemnee's position would accept less than
full indemnity (plus, perhaps, an additional sum for the inconvenience
of dispossession); absent compulsion, no prudent buyer would offer to
purchase unnecessary fixtures or pay for the seller's business losses 2
In short, our hypothetical "willing buyer and seller" could not be
expected voluntarily to come to terms. And yet, a jury or commission
is solemnly instructed in eminent domain proceedings that the fair
market value approach provides a standard which, when applied even
to the facts of these cases, will provide a fair award.
It is common knowledge, of course, that compensation
proceedings often degenerate into a battle of sharply conflicting
opinions as to valuation, some of which purport to be "expert." So
long as the final award is within the range of this testimony, reversal
on grounds of inadequacy or excessiveness of the award is remote
indeed 4 As compared with the indemnity approach, then, market
31. Urban renewal furnishes an excellent example of the "takedown cost" principle. The
basis on which federal grants are computed is "net project cost," the difference between (I) the
total cost of acquisition, demolition, and site preparation and (2) the value of the vacant land
thereafter made available for sale and redevelopment. 42 U.S.C. § 1460(0 (1964).
32. See J. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY 59-61 (1965), especially the author's
conclusion that "the willing-buyer, willing-seller incantation is a great bar to clear thinking in the
law. ... Id. at 61.
In Canada, it is customary to award a 10% "compulsory taking allowance" in addition to
the market value of the land, to compensate for "contingent losses and inconvenience." The King
v. Hunting, Barrow & Bell, 32 D.L.R. 331 (1916); Pawson v. City of Sudbury [1953] Ont. 988.
This was formerly also the English practice, until superseded by the Acquisition of Land Act,
1919,9 & 10 Geo. V, c. 57, § 2.
33. "It is the unfortunate tendency of the condemnee's witfiesses to stretch high while the
condemnor's equally competent experts stoop low as they state their opinions of market value."
Boyer & Wilcox, supra note 19, at 253. In one recent case, the valuation evidence concerning a
leasehold ranged from $5,200 to $29,412, Estell v. State Highway Comm'n, 254 Iowa 1238, 119
N.W.2d 900 (1963); in another, a jury found the value of a leasehold to be $18,139, which
contrasted sharply with a Board of Viewers' finding of zero damages, Profit-Sharing Blue Stamp
Co. v. Urban Redev. Auth., 429 Pa. 396, 241 A.2d 116 (1968); testimony as to the value of a fee
simple ranged between $7,500 and $58,000 in Frontage, Inc. v. Allegheny County, 413 Pa. 31,
195 A.2d 515 (1963).
The socioeconomic status of the condemnee may also affect the ultimate award. Fuller,
Practical Aspects oJ Trying an Eminent Domain Case, 13 S.D. L. REv. 81 (1968).
34. 6 NICHOLS § 26.731. These comments are typical: "Finally, it is difficult to see that
clear error exists, for the evidence of value was highly conflicting and the compensation award is
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value is less predictable in application. It does, however, virtually
assure a lower final award.
The contrast between indemnity and market value approaches is
nowhere more starkly illustrated than in divided ownership situations.
In one infamous case,3 5 application of the market value approach
resulted in an award that was not even sufficient to pay the
outstanding mortgage on the land. "Just compensation"3 consisted of
wiping out the condemnee's equity while a balance of approximately
1,900 dollars remained unpaid on her mortgage 7
It may be possible to dismiss such cases as atypical fact
situations to which the application of the market value approach
produced harsh results. Arguably, these aberrational cases offer
insufficient cause to question the general utility of the approach.
Commercial leaseholds, however, offer a much broader base for
criticism. The loss of profits, goodwill, and fixtures are the usual, not
the exceptional, result of a taking of such interests3 8  In addition,
without compensation for out-of-pocket moving and relocation
expenses, the lessee often suffers a net cash loss of sizeable
proportions as a result of the taking 9 If, as some commentators have
within the range of the evidence." United States v. Certain Lands, 183 F.2d 320, 322 (3d Cir.
1950). "This court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial court as to the amount of
the damage." State v. Olsen, 76 Nev. 176, 184, 351 P.2d 186, 190 (1960).
35. Riley v. Redevelopment Land Agency, 246 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
36. The difficulty arose out of the fact that a purchase money mortage loan represented a
large proportion of the initial purchase price. The condemnor's appraisers testified that the
original purchase price was unreasonably high and that no buyer for cash would pay such a price.
The prevailing market value approach contemplates a price based on a cash transaction, or terms
essentially equivalent to cash. Kerr v. South Park Comm'rs, 117 U.S. 379 (1886).
37. A divided court of appeals reversed, following a hearing en banc. The majority,
however, experienced considerable difficulty in formulating an acceptable rationale. The trial
judge was ordered to instruct the jury more favorably to the condemnee upon remand, although
the original instruction was adjudged proper for use in other cases. Two dissenting judges saw this
as "a reversal without an appellate holding that any error occurred at the trial." 246 F.2d at 649.
The "cash price" doctrine seems justified, in light of the usual requirement that the
condemnor pay in cash or its equivalent. 3 NICHOtS § 8.2. Rigid adherence to it in a case like
Rilei' would be unconscionable. Nevertheless the district court and two members of the court
of appeals felt bound to follow it. Their attitude contrasts sharply with the view stated by the text
writers, that compensation rules are applied flexibly in view of the diverse factual situations
presented by eminent domain cases. See JAHR § 71; 4 NICHOLS § 12.1, at 7-9; I ORGEL § 18.
38. E.g., Ballantyne v. City of Omaha, 173 Neb. 229, 113 N.W.2d 486 (1962); City of
Durham v. Eastern Realty Co., 270 N.C. 631, 155 S.E.2d 231 (1967). See Polasky, The
Condemnation of Leasehold Interests, 48 VA. L. REV. 477, 521-34 (1962); Comment, Eminent
Domain: Compensation for Leasehold Interests Where No Provision in Lease, 48 MARQ. L.
REV. 90 (1964). See generally Comment, Eminent Domain Valuations in all Age oJ
Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61 (1957).
39. The urban, renewal program provides additional payments to displaced businesses to
reimburse "reasonable and necessary moving expenses and any actual direct losses of property
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said,"° the law of compensation in eminent domain is developing in the
direction of an indemnity approach, the commercial leasehold cases
invite re-examination.
It appears that a reappraisal is already under way, as a result of
which the compensation payable to lessors and lessees should more
closely approximate their actual losses. The legal issue is not framed
in terms of indemnity for the condemnees; rather, it is whether or not
they are entitled to independent valuation of their respective leasehold
and reversionary interests when the condemnor acquires the entire fee
simple estate. Superficially, this is a procedural question, but the
manner of its resolution profoundly affects the adequacy of the final
award. This thesis can be demonstrated through an examination of
the widely accepted "unit valuation" rules.
III. COMPENSATION IN LEASEHOLD-REVERSION CASES:
UNIT 'VALUATION
A. The Method
In the vast majority of American jurisdictions, when a
condemnor acquires a fee simple estate in land consisting of a base
fee subject to a leasehold interest, the compensation award is
computed in two steps. First, the value of an unencumbered fee simple
estate in the land taken is determined. Second, this amount is
apportioned between the lessee and the reversioner." The process has
been described as follows:
In the majority of states as well as under the federal rules of procedure,
eminent domain is procedurally an in rem action. That is to say, the land itself is
taken rather than the separate interests of the individuals claiming rights in
except goodwill or profit," subject to prescribed ceilings. 42 U.S.C. § 1465(b) (1964).
Such payments are, of course, a matter of legislative grace rather than constitutional
requirement. Federal and state programs do not customarily include such provisions. Their
inclusion in the urban renewal program possibly reflects a conviction that more leniency is
desirable since the takings ultimately "redound to the direct benefit of profit-making
corporations." Comment, supra note 38, at 96. The nature of the ultimate land use appears
to be an inadequate justification for discriminatory treatment in awarding compensation to
condemnees. In 1965, Congress extended these benefits to six other programs. See 42
U.S.C. § 3074 (Supp. 1, 1965).
40. At least three commentators have reported an observation that compensation doctrine is
evolving in the direction of indemnity. Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and
Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 596, 599-601 (1954); Polasky, The Condemnation of Leasehold
Interests, 48 VA. L. REV. 477, 487 (1962). For exposition of contrary analyses, see Lenhoff,
Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 596, 607-15, 638 (1942);
Comment, supra note 38, at 66-7 1.
41. JAHR §§ 122, 130-31; 2 J. LEWIS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 716 (3d ed. 1909); I
ORGEL §§ 109, 113.
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relation to the land. The condemnor therefore pays only for the value of the land
unenhanced by the separate estate6 or interests.
Under this concept of eminent domain, the constitutional requirement [of
just compensation] . . . is met when the value of the unencumbered land is
ultimately determined and the monetary equivalent of its worth deposited with
the court. Since condemnation extinguishes all rights existing in relation to the
land, the estates or interests of the various owners are then in theory transferred
to the eminent domain award.
The tenant and all others claiming an interest in the land are then entitled to
share proportionately in the distribution of the awards according to the nature of
their compensable interests!
2
In a typical case, landlord and tenant apparently have a joint
concern for achievement of the highest possible award in step one, but
at step two, each can maximize his award only at the expense of the
other. The condemnor, on the other hand, is concerned only with step
one. Upon final determination of its total liability, it has no further
interest in the proceedings, since it simply pays the prescribed sum
into the court and leaves the condemnees to settle the apportionment
question between themselves? 3 In step one, the market value test is
usually applied. At step two, lease provisions respecting allocation of
the recovery, if any, are usually controlling 4 In the absence of such
42. Baker, Condemnation: Concepts and Consequences of Public Intervention in the
Landlord-Tenant Relationship, 9 U. KAN. L. REv. 399, 401-02 (1961).
43. "[I]he allocation of compensation between lessor and lessee is of no concern to the
State. It was not necessary for the jury to consider or determine the lessees' damages separately."
State v. Lenox, 237 N.E.2d 248, 254 (Ind. 1968). "Neither the condemnor nor the jury is
concerned with the rights of individual claimants, but only with the amount of just compensation
to be awarded for the property taken." State v. Flick, 427 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Mo. 1968).
Typically, title passes to the condemnor when compensation has been finally determined and
paid into court. 3 NicHOLS §§ 8.711, 8.713. The United States may, however, proceed under its
"quick-taking" statute, 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1964), to acquire the title prior to final judgment. It
is required to file a declaration of taking in federal court and to deposit into court its estimate of
the required compensation; title thereupon vests in the United States. The amount of the final
award to the condemnee is the only issue to be litigated.
A number of states have comparable procedures which occasionally encounter judicial
resistance. E.g., Yellowstone Pipe Line Co. v. Drummond, 77 Idaho 36, 287 P.2d 288 (1955);
Department of Pub. Works v. Gorbe, 409 I11. 211, 98 N.E.2d 730 (1951). A modified version of
the Illinois statute was approved in Department of Pub. Works v. Butler Co., 13 I11. 2d 537, 150
N.E.2d 124 (1958).
44. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.55 (J. Casner ed. 1952).
Orgel is skeptical of such provisions: "[T]hey are generally very poorly drawn, apparently by
attorneys who have no special knowledge of the law of eminent domain. They must therefore be
'interoreted' by reference to the presumed 'intention' of the parties-a somewhat difficult
matter in view of the likelihood that the parties had no definite intention at all." 1 ORGEL § 121,
at 527. For possible corroboration, see Waesche v. Redevelopment Agency, 155 Conn.
44, 229 A.2d 352 (1967).
Another complicating factor is inequality of bargaining power between lessor and lessee,
which may be particularly striking in short-term leaseholds. See Baker, supra note 42, at 409.
For suggested lease provisions, see Report, Condemnation of Leasehold Interests, 3 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 226, 243-54 (1968).
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provisions, statutory or judicial rules of apportionment are employed.
A factor of primary significance in apportionment proceedings is
the effect of the taking on the leasehold relationship. A threshold issue
concerns the lessee's duty to pay rent. Under common law analysis,
eviction by the sovereign is not a violation of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment." consequently, the duty to pay rent is not affected by
condemnation proceedings. This result, indefensible in practical terms,
is no favorite of the commentators46 and has been rejected in cases
involving total takings 7  A few cases48  and statutes49  require
proportionate abatement of rent in cases of partial taking. Where,
however, there is no such relief, the lessee is entitled to compensation
respecting his liability for future rent as well as for deprivation of use
and occupancy of the land. 0 Although sound in theory, this result
raises practical difficulties5 The rule of proportional abatement of
rent seems clearly preferable.
But even if the duty to pay rent is abated, eviction from all or a
part of the leased premises often imposes substantial financial
detriment upon lessees52 In hope of receiving compensation for such
losses, they have pressed two alternative arguments: (1) the
condemnor is required to pay such damages independently of the
value of the land taken, or (2) compensation for such losses must be
included in the lessee's portion of the final award. If relief on the
45. The covenant is breached upon eviction of the tenant by one claiming under the landlord
or one asserting a title superior to the landlord's. Eminent domain is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, exercisable irrespective of the landlord's title or consent. Consequently, the taking
does not breach the covenant. I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 44, § 3.54. The tenant
is thus prevented from recovering damages from his landlord for eviction resulting from a taking.
4 NICHOLS § 12A2[l].
46. "[lI]t is much the better and more practical rule to allow a taking of the entire property
to operate as a termination of the obligation to pay rent . . . ." 4 NICHOLS § 12.42[1], at 305.
"if this is not done, a difficult problem of apportioning the award arises, because the landlord
may have suffered an injury when his right to the future rentals is not secured by the premises." I
ORGEL at 522.
47. I A.MERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 44, at 289 n.5; cJ. 4 NICHOLS § 12.42[2]; I
ORGEL § 121.
48. See I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 44, at 289 n.9; Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. v. State, 22 N.Y.2d 75, 238 N.E.2d 759, 291 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1968).
49. See 4 NICHOLS at 309 n.46.
50. See 4 NICHOLS § 12.42[3]; I ORGEL§ 121.
51. For example, "[l]t might happen in many cases that a tenant . . . would spend the sum
awarded or waste it by unfortunate investments before the end of the term, so that the landlord
would lose his rent altogethei." 4 NICHOLS at 304.
52. For example, loss or depreciation of fixtures, equipment, and improvements; cost of




former theory is denied, the lessee is forced to press his argument
twice during the proceeding: initially, to maximize the total award,
and later to maximize his recovery in the apportionment of that
award between himself and the lessor. The tender of such evidence
presents the lessor with an uncomfortable conflict of interest: he also
wishes to maximize the total award, but must minimize the
proportion representing the lessee's ultimate recovery? 3 Evidence of
such losses is likely to be ruled inadmissible against the condemnor
unless it can be established that their existence would affect the price
a willing buyer would pay and a willing seller would accept for the
leasehold interest 4 Consequently, the lessee's best opportunity for
recovery of such losses is in the apportionment proceeding. It is
impossible to generalize about the lessee's prospects, because they
vary radically depending upon the apportionment formula which is
employed. There are two basic formulas.
1. Reversion valuation method.-The lessor's compensation is
determined by adding the capitalized value of the income receivable
under the lease to the commuted value of his reversion. The balance
of the (previously determined) total compensation is awarded to the
lessee 5 This formula is reputed to be the preferred method where the
unexpired portion of the leasehold is a long term5 But in such cases,
some courts have awarded a minimal or zero value to the reversion
because of its remoteness, treating the lessor's interest as the
equivalent of an annuity 5 7
2. Leasehold valuation method.-The "rental value" of the
lessee's interest is determined by first assigning a fair rental, or
"economic rent," payable for the leased property5 If this amount
53. In Sholom, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, 246 Md. 688, 229 A.2d 576 (1967), the lessor
contended that evidence of the value of an option to renew should have been admitted-even
though theoretically such evidence could benefit only the lessee. Maryland's Court of Appeals
recognized, however, that the lessor's somewhat awkward position was action in its "enlightened
self-interest." Id. at 701, 229 A.2d at 583. For further illustrations of dilemmas facing landlord
and tenant, see Purnell, The Valuation of the Leasehold Estate, 1959 INST. ON EM. Dom. 79, 94-
95.
54. See text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
55. F. BABCOCK, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 247-65 (1924); 1 ORGEL § 125; J.
STEWART, REAL ESTATE APPRAISAL IN A NUTSHELL 173-85 (1967); Polasky, supra note 38, at
519-21.
56. I ORGEL § 122.
57. See authorities cited at note 55 supra.
58. "The legal profession, and largely without the aid of academic economists, has arrived
at a practical solution for the determination of economic rent. Further, the determination is in
accord with sound economic theory. The solution of the law is the concept of fair rental value as
an imputed measure of economic rent." Boyer & Wilcox, supra note 19, 'at 266.
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exceeds the rent specified in the lease, the lessee's recovery is the
aggregate of this excess throughout the remaining term of the lease,"
and the balance of the award is paid to the lessor. Where the stated
rent equals or exceeds the economic rent, the lease has no "rental
value." If the lease grants the lessee an option to renew or purchase,
the value of this right 0 is added to the rental value of the leasehold,
and the sum is the market value of the leasehold. t The leasehold
valuation method is said to be especially efficacious where short-term
leases are concerned,"2 although the asserted utility differential
between apportionment methods based upon the length of the
unexpired leasehold term is admittedly not grounded in "formal
doctrine."63 Each method has, of course, many variations. 4
Fair rental value is established in largely the same way as fair market value of a fee simple
estate: expert testimony. This evidence is often sharply conflicting. See, e.g., Eisenring v. Kansas
Turnpike Auth., 183 Kan. 774, 332 P.2d 539 (1958). In State v. Corkerham, 182 So. 2d 786 (La.
App. 1965), the court merely averaged the divergent expert conclusions as to economic rent.
As Boyer & Wilcox point out, the "experts" often do not even attempt an independent
calculation of the value of the lessee's interest. Boyer & Wilcox, supra note 38, at 267-75.
59. See 4 NICHOLS § 12.42[3]; I ORGEL § 126. Where the agreed rent is payable on a
monthly basis, the economic rent is also established in monthly installments. The excess of agreed
rent over economic rent, multiplied by the number of months remaining in the term, equals the
gross leasehold "bonus" value. This sum, when discounted to present terms, is the net rental
value. See Profit-Sharing Blue Stamp Co. v. Urban Redev. Auth. 429 Pa. 396, 241 A.2d
116 (1968).
60. Options to renew or to purchase, when destroyed pursuant to the power of eminent
domain, are treated as compensable property interests. Sholom, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, 246
Md. 688, 229 A.2d 576 (1967). Their value is added to the lessee's portion of the award. Baker,
supra note 42, at 409-11.
61. This is a fictitious concept, since leases "are so infrequently sold, and vary so much in
length of term, rent reserved and other particulars as well as in the character of the property, that
it is almost impossible to apply the customary tests of market value to a leasehold interest." 4
NICHOLS 318. See also Note, A Survey oJ Landlord and Tenant in Eninent Doniain, 3 WILL
L.J. 39, 48 (1964); Comment, Eminent Domain: Compensation for Leasehold Interest Where No
Provision in Lease, 48 MARQ. L. REV. 90, 93 (1964). Consequently, courts have attempted to
establish an "intrinsic" value for leaseholds through application of the test described in the text
accompanying notes 58-59 supra. Land Clearance for Redev. Corp. v. Doernhoefer, 389
S.W.2d 780 (Mo. 1965).
Frank recognition of the unsuitability of customary tests to determine the market value of
leaseholds led the Supreme Court of Iowa to formulate a more flexible, indemnity-oriented
approach. In Des Moines Wet Wash Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 197 Iowa 1082, 198 N.W.
486 (1924), the court perceptively observed that "Ithe real right of which [the lessee] is
deprived .. .is the right to remain in undisturbed possession and enjoyment to the end of the
term" and concluded that, in determining the lessee's aiard, "[v]alue must be determined by a
consideration of the uses to which the property is adapted. All circumstances naturally affecting
this value are open to consideration." Id. at 1087, 1089, 198 N.W. at 488, 489.
62. JAHR § 131; I ORGEL § 126.
63. I ORGEL 528.
64. See, e.g., Hitchings, The Valuation of Leasehold Interests and Some Elements of
Damage Thereto, SECOND ANN. INST. ON E-i. Dosi. 61 (1960). In T. & D. Golf, Inc. v. State, 53
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B. Application of the Unit Valuation Method: A Critique
If the owner of an estate in fee simple absolute transfers a
leasehold interest in that estate, it becomes fragmented into two parts,
the leasehold and the reversion. If the leasehold is later transferred
back to the reversioner, his estate in fee simple absolute is restored;
the leasehold is said to "merge" into the reversion. The relationships
among the three interests may be expressed algebraically: leasehold
(L) plus reversion (R) equals estate in fee simple (E), or L + R = E.
If we apply elementary algebraic concepts to the equation,"' it
follows that E - L = R, and that E - R = L. It would make no difference
if we assigned the character X, or "unknown," to one interest in each
of these two formulas. Its identity may be deduced from-indeed it
is compelled by-disclosure of the identity of the other two interests.
If the foregoing statements are true regarding the quantum
relationships among these various interests, it would seem to follow
that they would also be true as to the value relationships. Thus, the
value of the estate in fee simple (Ev) is equal to the sum of the values
of its constituent interests, the leasehold (Lv) and the reversion (Rv).
Thus, Lv + Rv = Ev. And if this be true, it seemingly follows that
Ev - Rv = Lv and Ev - Lv = Rv. That is, if we know the value of the
estate in fee simple and of the reversion, we can compute the value of
the leasehold; or, given the value of the estate in fee simple and the
value of the leasehold, we can compute the value of the reversion. This
is precisely the assumption underlying the unit valuation method and
its corollary apportionment formulas: first value the entire fee, then
value one of the constituent interests, then give the balance of the
award to the other condemnee.
This analysis is beguilingly simple, but unfortunately, inaccurate.
The value of leasehold plus the value of reversion do not necessarily
equal the value of a fee simple estate. Hence, the balance of the award
may bear scant relationship to to the value of the interest of the
condemnee who receives it.
Misc. 2d 1046, 280 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Ct. Cl. 1967), the so-called "reversion principle" was
employed. A value is assigned to -he land and structures as of the time of expiration of the lease
and then discounted by the length of the remaining term to determine the present value of the
reversion. The proportion which the present value of the reversion bears to the undiscounted value
is the percentage of the award apportioned to the lessor. The lessee receives the rest.
Valuation and apportionment formulas become even more complicated in cases where only a
portion of the leased premises is taken. See Woodruff, Legal Damages in the Partial Taking of a
Leasehold Interest, FIrtH ANN. INST. ON EM. DoM. 137 (1963). Such cases present problems of
severance damage which are beyond the scope of this article.
65. Algebraic formulas are not completely foreign to judicial opinions in leasehold cases.
See, e.g., State v. Parkey, 295 S.W.2d 457, 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
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This apparent paradox is primarily attributable to the fact that
the lessor-lessee relationship is almost always accompanied by binding
private arrangements respecting the use and occupancy of land. These
convenants usually impose a more restricted use pattern upon the
lessee than the owner of an unencumbered fee simple estate would be
bound to observe. They are, in a sense, a burden on the land, and
their effect could be to reduce the aggregate value of the leasehold and
reversion below the value of an unencumbered fee simple estate. But
such convenants do not necessarily depress or reduce its income-
producing potential; in fact, their effect may be quite the reverse." In
any event, there is no universal correlation between the economic
return achievable by lessor and lessee individually under such
arrangements and the theoretical value of a hypothetical fee simple,
taking into consideration the "highest and best use" of the land. It
follows that there is no necessary correlation between the amount of
consideration for which lessee and reversioner would be willing to
transfer their respective interests, and the price which the owner of a
theoretical fee simple estate in the same land would accept. The
combined value of the "lesser" interests may be less than,"7 or greater
than,68 the value of the "total" estate. Only coincidentally would they
be exactly equal.
The formulations, Lv = Ev - Rv and Rv = Ev - Lv, incorporate
another fallacy. If one begins by assigning a value to the fee simple
estate, any increment of value assigned to one of the subsidiary
interests is accompanied by an exactly corresponding reduction in the
magnitude of the other. Thus, if the lessee has a "favorable" lease,"
his portion of the recovery is increased at the expense of the lessor.70
66. Shopping center leases, for instance, frequently impose limitations on the type of
business the lessee may operate and even upon the grade of merchandise he may sell. This
"burden" is cheerfully undertaken by the lessee, since his quid pro quo is the lessor's agreement
not to permit any other lessee in the shopping center to sell competitive merchandise.
Regardless of covenants restricting use, and of the fact that in a given case the economic
rental may not exceed the agreed rent, -[a] valuable economic situation is created when land is
occupied by satisfied tenants. ... Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41
YALE L.J. 221, 250 (1931).
67. This could easily occur where the lessee is restricted to a use which is not so
economically valuable as the land's "highest and best" use. See Boyer & Wilcox, supra note 19, at
260-61; McCormick, The Measure of Compensation in Eminent Domain, 17 MINN. L. REV. 461,
471-73 (1933).
68. See McCormick, supra note 67. at 474: Polasky, mtpra note 40, at 490-93: Note,
Condemnation and the Lease, 43 IOWA L. REv. 279, 282 (1958).
69. A "favorable" lease occurs when the economic rent exceeds the stipulated rental. See
text accompanying notes 58 & 59 supra.
70. See, e.g., Department Pub. Works v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 42 lll.App. 2d 378,




Theoretically, the lessor has been "extricated" from a relatively
unfavorable situation. If, however, his actual condemnation award,
invested in a medium of comparable quality to the leasehold, produces
a lower net return than his former rentals, it would be difficult indeed
to persuade him that he has received fair compensation for the interest
he has lost.' If the lease is "unfavorable" to the lessee,72 theoretically
it has a negative value, and the lessee has received a benefit from the
taking. The doctrine of special benefits in eminent domain has not
developed so fully that it would be predicted that the lessee will be
required to account to the condemnor for the benefit.73 At the least it
can be predicted that in such a case the rental value of the lease is
zero.74 This result will amaze and anger the lessee, if his operations on
the leased premises happen to be profitable. In fact, from his point of
view the unfairness is compounded twice over: he has lost a property
interest which he would not willingly have surrendered without
compensation, and the failure to compensate him for his interest has
conferred an unearned and undeserved benefit upon the lessor, who in
effect is treated as the sole owner.
When the sum of the values of the leasehold and the reversion, as
independently determined, is less than the market value of a fee
simple estate in the same land, application of the usual apportionment
formulas confers a windfall, or "bonus," upon that condemnee who
receives the balance of the award after computation of the value of
the other condemnee's interest.75 Conversely, where the aggregate
value of leasehold and reversion exceeds the value of a fee simple
7 1. Differentials in net return reflect not only the variations in rate of return from different
investment media, but also disparities in tax treatment which must be considered by the investor.
72. A lease is "unfavorable" when the stipulated rent equals or exceeds the economic rent.
73. In cases of partial taking, severance damages are usually subject to mitigation on
account of special benefits accruing to the remainder of the condemnee's land as a result of
installation of the public improvement. This is a set-off; the condemnee is not required to make
cash contributions for the value of such benefits in excess of his damages unless the doctrine of
special assessments is applicable. 3 NICHOLs §§ 8.62, 8.6209.
74. "So that no matter how valuable a lease may be to a particular tenant, if it is not a
lease at less than the rental value of the premises the tenant is entitled to nothing." In re Real
Property in Borough of Manhattan, 19 App. Div. 2d 44, 52-53, 241 N.Y.S.2d 44, 53 (1963)
(concurring opinion). See Ballantyne Co. v. City of Omaha, 173 Neb. 229, 113 N.W.2d 486
(1962).
75. For illustration of a large windfall for the tenant, see Boyer & Wilcox, supra note 19, at
268. For illustration of large differences in award resulting from different apportionment methods,
and a possible windfall to the landlord, see Polasky, supra note 40, at 496-97, 501-03.
Boyer & Wilcox call for more equitable apportionment of the surplus. Boyer & Wilcox, supra
note 38, at 271. Adoption of compensation standards which do not create such windfalls would ap-
pear to be a more satisfactory solution.
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estate, at least one of the condemnees will be undercompensated.70
Since it is almost impossible to predict the distribution of windfalls
or losses in advance of condemnation proceedings, the ability of the
parties to protect themselves through appropriate provisions in the
lease agreement is severely restricted 7
It is not surprising that condemnees have sought to prevent the
application of these apportionment formulas on the ground that they
do not provide a measure of compensation in conformity with the
constitutional requirement. Phrased another way, the contention has
been that the Constitution requires individual, independent valuation
of each separate interest. We shall next examine the authorities
bearing on this contention.
IV. INDEPENDENT VALUATION OF DIVIDED INTERESTS
A. In General
In Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston78 the city condemned
a private way for use as a public street. The base fee was owned by
the Chamber of Commerce, subject to an easement of way, light and
air, which had been reserved in the conveyance to it by the owner of
adjoining land. 79 The condemnees agreed among themselves to accept
a lump sum recovery. They then contended that, since the sum of
their respective interests aggregated an unrestricted fee simple estate in
the land, the recovery should amount to the full value of the land-by
stipulation, 60,000 dollars. The city argued that the damage to the inter-
ests of the condemnees was minimal: as restricted by the easement, the
base fee had little use potential, and therefore only nominal value.
Since the taking was for the purpose of conversion into a public
street, the owner of the dominant tenement could continue to use the
land for ingress and egress and thus had suffered only nominal
damage as a result of the taking. The parties agreed that, should the
city's contention be upheld, the total required compensation would be
only 5,000 dollars.The Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the Supreme Judicial
76. Both cannot receive full compensation. If one does, the other will absorb the full
detriment attributable to the inadequacy of the award.
77. Where such provisions have been employed, disputes over their application have
ienerated considerable litigation. See note 44 supra.
78. 217 U.S. 189 (1910).
79. The land taken was also subject to a mortgage lien. Apparently there was no
controversy between the Chamber of Commerce and the mortgagee over application of the award
toward reduction of the indebtedness. The litigation thus centered around the valuation of the base
fee and the easement.
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Court of Massachusetts'" upholding the trial court's award of 5,000
dollars to the condemnees. The opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes contains
the following explication of the Court's conclusion that separate valua-
tion of the condemnee's interests was proper:
It is true that the mere mode of occupation does not necessarily limit the right of
an owner's recovery. [Cites cases.] But the Constitution does not require a
disregard of the mode of ownership-of the state of the title. It does not require
a parcel of land to be valued as an unencumbered whole when it is not held as an
unencumbered whole. It merely requires that an owner of property taken should
be paid for what is taken from him. It deals with persons, not with tracts of
land. And the question is what has the owner lost, not what has the taker
gained 8'
This passage has occasioned considerable confusion. Out of
context, the last sentence could be interpreted as an assertion that the
Constitution incorporates the indemnity approach. But this
interpretation is completely inconsistent with the Court's oft-repeated
endorsement of the market value approach82 In fact, Holmes himself
accepted market value as the basic standard of compensation in
eminent domain cases. s3
What, then, is the proper interpretation of the holding? The
crucial issue was whether or not the base fee could be combined with
the easement, requiring an award equivalent to the value of an
unencumbered fee simple. Since these divided ownership interests were
voluntarily created and were in independent existence at the time of
taking, the Court refused to sanction the merger which the parties had
attempted to effect by private agreement subsequent to the taking. 8
The justification for this approach is that the law takes the
condemnees as it finds them; that is, it compensates them for the
interests which they actually owned at the date of taking and which
they lost as a result of the taking.
This does not mean, however, that these condemnees would
inevitably be relegated to nominal damages in every conceivable case.
Suppose, for instance, that the city had proposed to construct a public
building on the property taken. The base fee, or servient tenement,
80. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 195 Mass. 338, 81 N.E. 244 (1907).
.81. 217 U.S. at 195.
82. See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
83. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
84. "The petitioners contended that they had a right, as a matter of law under the
Constitution, after the taking was complete and all rights were fixed, to obtain the connivance or
concurrence of the dominant owner, and by means of that to enlarge a recovery that otherwise
might be limited to a relatively small sum . . . .The statement of the contention seems to us to
be enough." 217 U.S. at 194.
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would still have only a nominal or nuisance value, since productive
use of the land was already denied to its owner., ' With respect to the
owner of the dominant tenement, however, the situation is now entirely
different from Boston Chamber of Commerce. If the benefit of the
easement substantially enhanced the value of his land, then its
destruction would undoubtedly cause him more than nominal damage.
The owner of such an interest, under no compulsion to sell, would
refuse to part with it for a merely nominal sum. Accordingly,
substantial damage should be recoverable by him in such a case.
In cases where the taking of an easement causes substantial
damage to the owner of the dominant tenement, courts have
unhesitatingly awarded full compensation.86 Even more significantly,
they have refused to limit the condemnor's liability to the value of an
unencumbered fee simple estate in the land takenY Should the result
be different when the base fee is subject to a leasehold rather than an
easement? There is nothing in the rationales of these cases, or of
Boston Chamber of Commerce, to suggest that independent valuation
is not equally applicable to leasehold cases.
It is true that in Boston Chamber of Commerce employment of
the independent valuation approach resulted in a lower condemnation
award than the unit valuation approach would have required. Can it
be plausibly argued, then, that the Constitution permits the utilization
of independent valuation only when that approach will result in a
lower award than unit valuation? Such an hypothesis would conflict
directly with the statement that the Constitution "requires that an
owner of property taken should be paid for what is taken from him.
It deals with persons, not with tracts of land. And the question is
what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained.""8
Nevertheless, as we have already seen, the courts have generally
rejected independent valuation in leasehold cases, in favor of the unit
valuation approach.
B. Independent Valuation for Lessor and Lessee
Courts denying independent valuation in leasehold cases have
85. The usefulness, and therefore the value, of a base fee subject to an easement of way may
be favorably influenced by technology, since the fee owner is entitled to make any use not
interfering with the easement. Structural and mechanical engineering innovations have made
development of air space feasible; thus, "air rights" above roadways may have substantial value.
See R. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF AIRSPACE 305-41 (1968).
86. 4 NICHOLS § 12.41[1].
87. 1 ORGEL § Ill.
88. 217 U.S. at 195.
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placed principal reliance on two Supreme Court decisions. The
opinion in one was, ironically, written by Mr. Justice Holmes. 9
In United States v. Dunnington a lot in Washington, D.C.,
owned by a Confederate sympathizer, was confiscated and sold at
public auction in 18639 Nine years later, the lot was acquired by the
United States in proceedings brought by the Secretary of the Interior
and became a part of the Capitol grounds. The compensation award
was determined by court-appointed commissioners and deposited into
court, and an order was then issued confirming title in the United
States. The court later approved payment of the entire award to
persons claiming under the purchaser at the confiscation sale.
Much later, the heirs of the original owner brought an action in
the Court of Claims, seeking compensation on account of the taking.
They contended that the forfeiture was operative only during their
ancestor's lifetime; consequently, upon his death-they succeeded to an
unencumbered fee simple estate in the lot. The Court of Claims
agreed with them and awarded compensation. Both parties appealed."
A crucial issue was whether the claimants were bound by the
condemnation proceedings. They argued that the forfeiture divested
their ancestor of standing to enter an appearance and that they had
had no enforceable interest at that time as his heirs, since he was still
living. This contention was rejected. The Court held that, even though
the forfeiture originally divested the ancestor of the right to possess or
transfer the property during his lifetime, the presidential amnesity
proclamation of December 25, 1868, had "restored to him the right
to make such use of the remainder as he saw fit." 9 2 Further,
compliance by the condemnor with procedural requirements had put
the ancestor on legal notice of the proceeding, and he was bound by
it. As a result, the United States acquired the remainder interest as
effectively as the life estate.
The Court next considered whether or not the claimants were
entitled to compensation for the taking of the remainder. Since their
89. A. W. Duckett & Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 149 (1924) (Holmes, J.); United States
v. Dunnington, 146 U.S. 338 (1892).
- 90. The proceedings were authorized by Act of July 17, 1862, ch.- 195, 12 Stat. 589. An
accompanying joint resolution added the clarification that no forfeiture was operative beyond the
natural life of the offender. Joint Res. July 17, 1862, No. 63, 12 Stat. 627.
91. The award was based on the value of the lot as of the date of taking. The claimants
contended that they were entitled to a greater sum representing the market value on the date their
ancestor died, more than fourteen years after the original condemnation proceeding. This
apparently was the basis of their appeal.
92. 146 U.S. at 350.
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claim was 'filed more than fourteen years after payment of the original
award into court, discussion of the statute of limitations or laches
might have been expected, but the Court chose to rest its denial of
compensation on other grounds. It held that, since the original
proceeding was in rem, the award represented the "whole fee, and the
interests, both present and prospective, of every person concerned in
the property . . . . 3 This conclusion reflected a physical conception
of property: condemnation is a taking "not of the rights of designated
persons in the thing needed, but of the thing itself . . . . "4 Finally,
the Court held that, if there had been error in paying the entire award
to the holders of the life estate, that error was not to be imputed to
the United States.95
The conclusion that a compensation award "stands for" the land
taken is characteristic of a relatively primitive conception of real
property: that it is an object, rather than a legally protected
relationship among persons with respect to an object, which permits
the "owner" to exclude others 6 Although Holmes was not required
in Boston Chamber of Commerce to re-examine the result or
reasoning of Dunnington, his opinion clearly rejects the physical
conception in favor of the legal relations viewpoint: the Constitution
"deals with persons, not with tracts of land."97 There is, moreover, no
fundamental inconsistency between Holmes' rationale and the
proposition that (1) the condemnation proceeding is in rem, as a
result of which the condemnor acquires the entire estate, but (2) the
constitutional guarantee of just compensation confers upon each
condemnee a right (subject to the statute of limitations) to recover
damages from the condemnor.98
93. Id. at 351.
94. Crane v. City of Elizabeth, 36 N.J. Eq. 339, 343 (1882). cited in United States v,
Dunnington, 146 U.S. 338, 352-53 (1892); accord, Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United
States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893).
95. "The courts of the United States are in no sense agencies of the Federal Government,
nor is the laiter liable for their errors or mistakes ..... 146 U.S. at 351. See note 98 infra,
for a discussion of the validity of this conclusion.
96. For an excellent development of this distinction, see Cohen, Dialogue on Private
Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357 (1954). For discussion of its relevance to eminent domain, see
Cormack, Legal Concepis in Cases oJ Eininent Domain, 41 YALE L.J. 221 (193 1).
97. See note 81 supra. That language also repudiates this statement by Mr. Justice Brewer
in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893), decided one year
after Dunnington: "And this just compensation, it will be noticed, is for the property and not the
owner. Every other clause in the Fifth Amendment is personal." (emphasis added).
98. See Lenhoff, Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 CoLuw. L. REV. 596,
631-33 (1942). This approach would permit the condemnor to obtain title against unknown
owners who are not named in the proceeding, while preserving their right to compensation through
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In A. W. Duckett & Co. v. United States," decided fourteen
years after Boston Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Justice Holmes was
confronted with a controversy over compensation for the taking of a
leasehold interest. Pursuant to a statute enacted during World War
1,100 the Secretary of War had issued a notice, addressed "To Whom
It May Concern," stating that portions of the Bush Terminal in
Brooklyn were thereby "requisitioned for the use of the United States
Army" and adding the assurance that "steps will be promptly taken
to ascertain the fair compensation to be paid for the temporary use by
the government of the premises."' 10 1 The plaintiff, a lessee of one of
the terminal's piers, was dispossessed pursuant to this order and
brought an action in the Court of Claims to recover the value of its
interest0 2 in the pier. The action was grounded in implied contract,
arising out of the assurance contained in the notice. The Court of
Claims dismissed the complaint on the ground that, as a matter of
law, no contract could be implied, 03 and the condemnee appealed.
The Supreme Court held that the proceeding was analogous to
eminent domain, since the condemnor had "assumed to itself by
paramount authority and power the possession and control of the
piers named, against all the world."'0 4 The requisition was
characterized as a proceeding in rem: "Such an exercise of eminent
domain founds a new title and extinguishes all previous rights." °5 The
Court thus concluded that the plaintiff's interest had been effectively
taken pursuant to the Secretary's general order. The remaining
institution of "inverse condemnation" proceedings under statutes such as the Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. § 41(20) (1964). See United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 40 F. Supp. 436, 443-44(D.
Md. 1941) (dictum). Procedure in such situations is complicated by FED. R. CIv. P. 71A(c)
(2), which became effective on August I, 1951. This provision permits the condemnor, after a
"reasonably diligent search of the records," to join all other potential claimants under the
designation "Unknown Others." Service by publication is authorized by id., 71A(d) (3) (ii). It is
an open question whether this procedure constitutes a bar to maintenance of a Tucker Act claim.
3 BARRON & HOLZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1519 (Rules ed. rev. C. Wright
1958). C. FED. R. Civ. P. 7 IA(j): "'If the compensation finally awarded to any defendant exceeds
the amount which has been paid to him on distribution of the deposit [made pursuant to 40 U.S.C.
§ 258a (1964)], the court shall enter judgment against the plaintiff [condemnor] and in favor of
that defendant for the deficiency." Compare United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 339 F.2d
414 (3d Cir. 1964), with Cuyahoga County v. United States, 294 F.2d 775 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
99. 266 U.S. 149 (1924).
100. Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, 39 Stat. 619, 645.
101. 266 U.S. at 150.
102. The date of the notice was December 31, 1917; the United States took actual
possession on January 31, 1918; plaintiffs lease was scheduled to expire September 30, 1919.
103. 58 Ct. Cl. 234 (1923).
104. 266 U.S. at 151.
105. Id.
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question was whether or not the interest was a compensable one. The
Court answered affirmatively, characterizing the plaintiff's interest as
"part of the res." 16 Furthermore, the right to compensation was a
personal one, and the condemnor could not discharge its duty to pay
the plaintiff by settlement with the lessor or with other tenants.,t" The
judgment was reversed and the Court of Claims was directed, upon
remand, to award compensation to the plaintiff.
If the Court intended to sanction an award based upon any
standard other than independent valuation of the lessee's interest, in
conformity with Boston Chamber of Commerce, nothing in this
opinion so indicates.
The federal courts have not read Dunnington and Duckett in the
light of Boston Chamber of Commerce. They have upheld the unit
valuation procedure' 0' in condemnation proceedings involving lessor
and lessee, citing Dunnington and Duckett as authority."0 ' And the
Supreme Court itself has signalled approval of this procedure in a
case involving the taking of a flowage easement."0
The state courts have been more willing to question unit
valuation. One of the earliest cases was City oJ Baltimore v. Latrobe."'
There, the city had taken part of a lot that was subject to an annual
ground rent of 300 dollars under a 99-year lease, renewable in perpe-
tuity."' The lessor and the city cross-appealed from the trial court's
compensation award,"' and the Court of Appeals of Maryland was
required to formulate a rule for the guidance of lower state courts in
similar cases. While accepting the majority view that the condemnor
"as a rule ought not to be required to pay for the two interests more
106. Id. at 152.
107. "Any arrangement that the Government might have made with the owner [sic. i.e.,
lessor] to pay to it what might be due to the tenants or some of them did not affect the claimant's
rights." Id. at 151.
108. See text accompanying notes 41 & 42 supra.
109. E.g., United States v. 53 1/4 Acres of Land, 176 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1949); Eagle Lake
Improvement Co. v. United States, 160 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1947); United States v. 25.936 Acres
of Land, 153 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1946); Meadows v. United States, 144 F.2d 751 (4th Cir. 1944);
United States v. 150.29 Acres of Land, 135 F.2d 878 (7th Cir. 1943).
110. "There can be no quarrel either with the [trial] court's procedure in directing the
Commissioners to appraise first the easement taken by the Government, and then to apportion its
value between the respondent and the owner of the servient fee." United States v. Virginia Elec.
& Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 632 (1961).
II1. 101 Md. 621, 61 A. 203 (1905).
112. Perpetual ground rents created in Maryland after 1884 were redeemable by the tenant
upon payment of a sum representing a 6% capitalization of the reserved rent. MD. ANN. COD. art.
21, § 103 (1966).




than the portion would be worth if owned by one person,""' the court
refused to endorse this as an inflexible standard. It declared that each
condemnee should be permitted to prove his damage independently of
the other, "and, if it be true that the values of the two interests are
more than what the lots would be worth if owned by one person, the
necessities of the case require apparent exception to the general
rule . . ,,15 The court then emphasized that this doctrine was
applicable to all leasehold-reversion cases (and not merely those
involving long-term ground rents) in which the condemnees could
"clearly show" that the aggregate value of their respective interests
exceeded the value of an unencumbered fee simple."'
This rule has been followed in subsequent Maryland decisions,"7
and a recent case suggests that independent valuation of the interests
of condemnees in leasehold-reversion cases is now the general rule,
rather than the exception, in that state. In Sholom, Inc. v. State
Roads Commission,"' the lessee held a five-year lease with alternative
options to renew for two additional five-year periods, or to purchase
within the initial five-year term. The trial court excluded proffered
evidence of the value of the option to purchase, and the condemnees
appealed. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the lessee should
have been permitted to offer valuation evidence with respect to either
the option to renew or the option to purchase, but not both."'
The court also rejected the condemnor's contention that the usual
two-step method for determining compensation should be employed
by the trial court upon remand. Significantly, this direction was not
preceded by a finding that the facts of the case qualified as an
exception to the "general rule" enunciated in Latrobe. Rather, the
court seems to have rejected the general rule itself, with the
astounding observation that it had previously been eroded by Latrobe
and a subsequent case.'2' The court endorsed the Holmes statement'2'
114. Id. at629,61 A. at 205.
115. Id. at631,61 A. at 206.
116. "Indeed when a piece of property which is subject to an ordinary lease for a short term
is taken, it may happen that, although the owner of the fee is allowed full value for the property
[i.e., its market value], the tenant must also be paid a large and substantial amount in addition by
reason of the value of his lease." Id. at 632, 61 A. at 206.
117. See, e.g., Viers v. State Roads Comm'n, 217 Md. 545, 143 A.2d 613 (1958).
118. 246 Md. 688, 229 A.2d 576 (1967).
119. Both options are valuable rights, and the value of each would ordinarily be recoverable
by the condemnee. Here, however, the two options were mutually exclusive: exercise of one
precluded exercise of the other.
120. State Roads Comm'n v. Novosel, 203 Md. 619, 102 A.2d 563 (1954). In that case,
however, the court did not even reach the question of independent valuation. And of course
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from Boston Chamber of Commerce as a "reasonably accurate
crystalization of all of the past statements of this court .... 111 It
is unfortunate that the stated rationale does not exhibit a degree of
candor comparable to the soundness of the holding.
In recent cases of first impression, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas'2 and a Georgia appellate court24 have reached a similar
conclusion, rejecting the condemnor's argument that the total award
to lessor and lessee may not exceed the value of a fee simple. Each
relied on Boston Chamber of Commerce. The Arkansas court added
that "it is plain that a lease may be so advantageous to both parties
that the combined market value of their separate estates exceeds what
the land would be worth if the lease had not been made.' '25
In another recent decision, People v. Lynbar, Inc.,'26 a California
appellate court reached the same conclusion about independent
valuation in spite of a procedural statute prescribing the two-step
approach to compensation.2' In addition, the statute had previously
been construed to prescribe the unit valuation rule.12 1 In Lynbar, the
lessee operated an automobile service station under a twenty-year
lease, calling for a minimum rental of 725 dollars per month. All parties
stipulated that the fair market value of an undivided fee simple was
125,000 dollars. The condemnees' witness was permitted to testify, how-
ever, that the value of the actual premises- including the lease-was
180,000 dollars. The trial court denied a motion to strike this testimony
and the condemnor appealed, contending that the statute required
valuation of the tract as if it were held in single ownership. 2
Latrobe cannot properly be said to have created, as a general rule, the test which it expressly
reserved only for exceptional cases. In fact, Labrobe had later been cited by the Maryland court as
an endorsement of the majority unit valuation rule. City of Baltimore v. Gamse & Brother, 132
Md. 290, 293, 104 A. 429, 430 (1918).
121. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
122. 246 Md. at 702, 229 A.2d at 583.
123. State Highway Comm'n v. Fox, 230 Ark. 287, 322 S.W.2d 81 (1959).
124. State Highway Dept: v. Thomas, 115 Ga. App. 372, 154 S.E.2d 812 (1967).
125. 230 Ark. at 289, 322 S.W.2d at 83.
126. 253 Cal. App. 2d 870, 62 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1967).
127. "Where there are two or more estates or divided interests in property sought to be
condemned, the plaintiff [condemnor] is entitled to have the amount of the award for said
property first determined as between plaintiff and all defendants having an interest therein:
thereafter in the same proceeding the i'espective rights of such defendants in and to the award shall
be determined by the court, jury or referee and the award apportioned accordingly." CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 1246.1 (vest 1955).
128. People v. City of Los Angeles, 220 Cal. App. 2d 345, 33 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1963); El
Monte School Dist. v. Wilkins, 177 Cal. App. 2d 47, 1 Cal. Rptr. 715 (1960); People v. S. & E.
Homebuilders, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 2d 105, 298 P.2d 53 (1956).
129. The condemnor's witnesses placed the land's value at Figures ranging from $52,000 to
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The judgement was affirmed. Although the court found support
in another statutory provision which seems to support its conclusion
that each outstanding interest must be separately valued,' it
perceived a constitutional infirmity in the condemnor's position.
Relying upon Boston Chamber of Commerce, it concluded that the
requirement of just compensation 3' necessitates separate valuation . 32
In addition to those discussed above, a few other jurisdictions
have applied the independent valuation approach in leasehold
reversion cases. 133 If the Boston Chamber of Commerce rationale
eventually achieves acceptance of a federal constitutional
requirement, 3' then all jurisdictions must do so; if not, an increasing
number of state courts and legislatures can be expected to reconsider
the wisdom of continued adherence to the traditional unit valuation
methodology.
V. CONCLUSION
Lessors and lessees subjected to a total or partial taking of their
interests by eminent domain are often confronted with serious
disruption of their commercial affairs. The detrimental impact of this
exercise of sovereign power against them can be ameliorated only by
$125,000. The trial court awarded a total of $125,000 to the condemnees, which placed the
condemnor in a somewhat awkward position in view of its stipulation that that was the value of
the fee simple estate. It could hardly argue that the award was excessive. Had the court held that
the condemnee's evidence was improperly admitted, however, the condemnor would have been
entitled to a new trial.
130. "The court, jury or referee must hear such legal testimony as may be offered by any of
the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess:
I. Value. The value of the property sought to be condemned ...and of each and every
separate estate or interest therein . CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1248 (West 1955) (emphasis
added).
131. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14 and the "'just compensation" clause of the fifth amendment
to the U.S. Constitution, as incorporated by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
253 Cal. App. 2d at 880, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 327-28.
132. Cf. Moore v. Kansas Turnpike Auth., 181 Kan. 840, 317 P. 2d 384 (1957) (dissenting
opinion).
133. E.g., Korf v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 501, 32 N.W.2d 85 (1948); State v. Platte Valley
Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 147 Neb. 289, 23 N.W.2d 300 (1946); Garella v. Redevelopment
Auth., 413 Pa. 181, 196 A.2d 344 (1964).
In a case involving the exercise of the federal power of eminent domain to take land owned by
the State of Nebraska, the Nebraska rule was rejected in favor of the federal procedure.
Nebraska v. United States, 164 F.2d 866 (1947), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 815 (1948). But cJi
United States v. Certain Property, 344 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1965).
134. See Cormack. .upra note 96, at 257: "This reasoning, applied consistently, would
seem upon constitutional grounds to prevent use of the value of the land as a single estate to limit
the compensation paid the owners of the various interests."
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prompt payment of adequate compensation for the resultant damage.
Unfortunately, the foregoing discussion suggests that widely accepted
methods for determining compensation in leasehold-reversion cases
are illogical in concept and capricious in application. Sometimes an
undeserved windfall is conferred upon one or both of the condemnees
at public expense. At other times, an inadequate award will impose a
disproportionate share of the cost of public improvements upon one
or both of them. Worst of all, the application of compensation rules
to specific cases is so unpredictable that neither party can adequately
protect himself through insertion of appropriate convenants in the
leasehold agreement.
This article has examined two conceptual bulwarks of existing
doctrine, the market value approach to compensation and the unit
valuation approach to apportionment. Our analysis indicates that
each is of questionable validity, if certainty of application and
adequacy of result are appropriate criteria for evaluation. The market
value approach precludes compensation for some of the actual costs
of eminent domain and is unrealistic since there is no real market for
leasehold interests anyway. Unit valuation is illogical because it is
based on the premise that the value of a fee always equals the sum of
the values of leasehold and reversion. Although the judiciary has not
manifested a willingness to depart from the utilization of the market
value standard, recent cases suggest that a judicial reassessment of the
unit valuation approach is already underway.",3 Adoption of the
independent valuation technique is undoubtedly a step in the direction
of more realistic standards for determining damage awards when
commercial leaseholds are taken in eminent domain.
Ultimately, responsibility for developing more adequate
approaches to compensation rests with the legislatures.'36 Should they
fail to meet this responsibility, recent evidence suggests that state
court judges may be increasingly persuaded to subject the traditional
approaches to "just compensation" for lessors and lessees to critical
re-examination. Conceivably, this process could result in modification,
or even rejection, of the market value test in eminent domain
proceedings involving lessors and lessees.
135. See text accompanying notes 111-33 supra.
136. Baker, supra note 42, at 402, reaches a similar conclusion. See also Michelman, supra
note 2, at 1248-53.
The draft of a Model Eminent Domain Code, published in 2 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 365
(1967), contains an express provision for valuation in divided ownership cases. In § 501(0, it
incorporates the substance of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-507 (Supp. 1964), which adopts the unit
valuation approach. This provision is criticized as inadequate in Note, Entinent
Domain-Problents of "'Just Compensation" Under the Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code of
1964, 113 U. PA. L. Ri:v. 787 (1965).
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